آقا رضا برای توسعه و "ارتقاء فکر" و توان بخشی به اندیشه انسانی بر یادگیری زبان دوم، جدا از کاربرد و فواید ظاهری زبان، از همین کودکی اصرار داشتم (1) و در مانیفست سه گانه رضایی در جای دوم قرارش دادم. به تعبیر خودم گفتم: انسانی که دو زبان رو بلد و مسلطه، مغز او مانند یک پراسسور دو هسته ای 64 بیت، در مقابل یک سی پی یو قدیمی 32 بیت تک هسته ایه که دیدی مال من جفتش سوخت! ام.آی.تی کتابی رو چاپ کرده (2)و مطالعه میکردم که گواه مهم دیگری بر اهمیت یاد گیری زبان به سرعت، با قدرت و از "همین حالاست". درنگ نکن آقا رضا! اون ظرف ماکارونی رو اگر هنوز گرمه و مامانت هم آشپز خوبیه اونقدر محکم نگیر، رهاش کن و پای کامپیوتر بیا. به من اعتماد کن رضا! بیا مرد
صفحه 61 از کتاب "زبان در ذهن" از موسسه ام.آی.تی و شروع توضیح در اینباره که چگونه یک زبان و هـــر زبان متفاوتی به نحوی تفکر و ذهن بشر رو به شکلی ژرف متاثر می کنه و به اون، به جهان بینی او و پردازش و تحلیلش شکل میده. می دونم برات چقدر سخته آقا رضا، اما ازت می خوام حتی به کندی این دو بند (از فصل چهار) این کتاب مهم رو بخونی و من هم در این فاصله مواظب غذات هستم چون ما با هم دوستای خوبی هستیم و من باید این کارو بکنم حتی اگر ازم نخواسته باشی
Language as Lens: Does the Language We Acquire Influence How We See the World?
By Lera Boroditsky, Lauren A. Schmidt, and Webb Phillips
4.1 Introduction
Speakers of different languages must attend to and encode strikingly different aspects of the world in order to use their language properly (Sapir 1921; Slobin 1996). For example, to say that ‘‘the elephant ate the peanuts’’ in English, we must include tense—the fact that the event happened in the past. In Mandarin, indicating when the event occurred would be optional and couldn’t be included in the verb. In Russian, the verb would need to include tense, whether the peanut-eater was male or female (though only in the past tense), and whether said peanut-eater ate all of the peanuts or just a portion of them. In Turkish, one would specify whether the event being reported was witnessed or hearsay. Do these quirks of languages affect the way their speakers think about the world? Do English, Mandarin, Russian, and Turkish speakers end up thinking about the world differently simply because they speak different languages? The idea that thought is shaped by language is most commonly associated with the writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Whorf, impressed by linguistic diversity, proposed that the categories and distinctions of each language enshrine a way of perceiving, analyzing, and acting in the world. Insofar as languages differ, their speakers too should differ in how they perceive and act in objectively similar situations (Whorf 1956). This strong Whorfian view—that thought and action are entirely determined by language—has long been abandoned in cognitive science. However, definitively answering less deterministic versions of the ‘‘Does language shape thought?’’ question has proven very difficult. Some studies have claimed evidence to the affirmative (e.g., Boroditsky 1999, 2001; Bowerman 1996; Davidoff, Davies, and Roberson 1999; Imai and Gentner 1997; Levinson 1996; Lucy 1992; Slobin 1996); others, evidence to the contrary (e.g., [Rosch] Heider 1972; Li and Gleitman 2002).
4.2 Thinking for Speaking
In part, the ‘‘Does language shape thought?’’ question has been difficult to answer because it is so imprecise. A different phrasing has been suggested by Slobin (1996), who proposed replacing language and thought with speaking, thinking, and thinking for speaking. One advantage of this substitution is that it allows us to distinguish between what are often called linguistic and nonlinguistic thought. Basically, cognitive processes involved in accessing and selecting words, placing them in grammatical structures, planning speech, and so on, are all instances of thinking for speaking. Thinking for speaking differs from one language to another. For example, when planning to utter a verb, English speakers never need to worry about grammatical gender agreement between the verb and the subject of the sentence. By contrast, Russian speakers do need to worry about this, and so their thinking for speaking will necessarily be different from that of English speakers.
4.3 Beyond Thinking for Speaking
A further question to ask is whether the habits that people acquire in thinking for speaking a particular language will manifest themselves in their thinking even when they are not planning speech in that language. What if people are performing some nonlinguistic task (i.e., a task that can be accomplished through some nonlinguistic means) or thinking for a different language? For example, are native Russian speakers more likely to notice whether all or only some of the peanuts were eaten even when they’re speaking English? One way to rephrase the ‘‘Does language shape thought?’’ question is to ask, ‘‘Does thinking for speaking a particular language have an effect on how people think when not thinking for speaking that same language?’’ 62 Boroditsky, Schmidt, and Phillips Further, how (through what cognitive mechanisms) can thinking for speaking a particular language exert influence over other types of thinking? Are some cognitive domains more susceptible to linguistic influence than others, and if so, why? For example, early work on color showed striking similarity in color memory among speakers of different languages despite wide variation in color terminology (Heider 1972; but see Davidoff, Davies, and Roberson 1999; Kay and Kempton 1984; Lucy and Shweder 1979). However, research into how people conceptualize more abstract domains like time has uncovered striking crosslinguistic differences in thought (Boroditsky 1999, 2001). Why would there be such strong evidence for universality in color perception, but quite the opposite for thinking about time? One possibility is that language is most powerful in influencing thought for more abstract domains, that is, ones not so reliant on sensory experience (Boroditsky 1999, 2000, 2001). While the ability to perceive colors is heavily constrained by universals of physics and physiology, the conception of time (say, as a vertical or a horizontal medium) is not constrained by physical experience and so is free to vary across languages and cultures (see Boroditsky 2000, 2001, for further discussion). In this chapter, I consider an extreme point along this concreteabstract continuum: the influence of grammatical gender on the way people think about inanimate objects. Forks and frying pans do not (by virtue of being inanimate) have a biological gender. The perceptual information available for most objects does not provide much evidence as to their gender, and so conclusive information about the gender of objects is only available in language (and only in those languages that have grammatical gender). This chapter examines whether people’s mental representations of objects are influenced by the grammatical genders assigned to these objects’ names in their native language."
۲ نظر:
آقا رضا برای توسعه و "ارتقاء فکر" و توان بخشی به اندیشه انسانی بر یادگیری زبان دوم، جدا از کاربرد و فواید ظاهری زبان، از همین کودکی اصرار داشتم (1) و در مانیفست سه گانه رضایی در جای دوم قرارش دادم. به تعبیر خودم گفتم: انسانی که دو زبان رو بلد و مسلطه، مغز او مانند یک پراسسور دو هسته ای 64 بیت، در مقابل یک سی پی یو قدیمی 32 بیت تک هسته ایه که دیدی مال من جفتش سوخت! ام.آی.تی کتابی رو چاپ کرده (2)و مطالعه میکردم که گواه مهم دیگری بر اهمیت یاد گیری زبان به سرعت، با قدرت و از "همین حالاست". درنگ نکن آقا رضا! اون ظرف ماکارونی رو اگر هنوز گرمه و مامانت هم آشپز خوبیه اونقدر محکم نگیر، رهاش کن و پای کامپیوتر بیا. به من اعتماد کن رضا! بیا مرد
(1) http://havayeneveshtan.blogspot.com/2006/05/blog-post_01.html#comments
(2) http://www.amazon.com/Language-Mind-Advances-Study-Thought/dp/0262571633/sr=1-1/qid=1163896802/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/104-3096082-7118330?ie=UTF8&s=books
صفحه 61 از کتاب "زبان در ذهن" از موسسه ام.آی.تی و شروع توضیح در اینباره که چگونه یک زبان و هـــر زبان متفاوتی به نحوی تفکر و ذهن بشر رو به شکلی ژرف متاثر می کنه و به اون، به جهان بینی او و پردازش و تحلیلش شکل میده. می دونم برات چقدر سخته آقا رضا، اما ازت می خوام حتی به کندی این دو بند (از فصل چهار) این کتاب مهم رو بخونی و من هم در این فاصله مواظب غذات هستم چون ما با هم دوستای خوبی هستیم و من باید این کارو بکنم حتی اگر ازم نخواسته باشی
Language as Lens:
Does the Language We
Acquire Influence How We See the World?
By
Lera Boroditsky, Lauren A. Schmidt, and Webb Phillips
4.1 Introduction
Speakers of different languages must attend to and encode strikingly
different aspects of the world in order to use their language properly
(Sapir 1921; Slobin 1996). For example, to say that ‘‘the elephant ate
the peanuts’’ in English, we must include tense—the fact that the event
happened in the past. In Mandarin, indicating when the event occurred
would be optional and couldn’t be included in the verb. In Russian, the
verb would need to include tense, whether the peanut-eater was male
or female (though only in the past tense), and whether said peanut-eater
ate all of the peanuts or just a portion of them. In Turkish, one would
specify whether the event being reported was witnessed or hearsay. Do
these quirks of languages affect the way their speakers think about the
world? Do English, Mandarin, Russian, and Turkish speakers end up
thinking about the world differently simply because they speak different
languages?
The idea that thought is shaped by language is most commonly associated
with the writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Whorf, impressed by
linguistic diversity, proposed that the categories and distinctions of
each language enshrine a way of perceiving, analyzing, and acting in the
world. Insofar as languages differ, their speakers too should differ in how
they perceive and act in objectively similar situations (Whorf 1956). This
strong Whorfian view—that thought and action are entirely determined
by language—has long been abandoned in cognitive science. However,
definitively answering less deterministic versions of the ‘‘Does language
shape thought?’’ question has proven very difficult. Some studies have
claimed evidence to the affirmative (e.g., Boroditsky 1999, 2001; Bowerman
1996; Davidoff, Davies, and Roberson 1999; Imai and Gentner
1997; Levinson 1996; Lucy 1992; Slobin 1996); others, evidence to the
contrary (e.g., [Rosch] Heider 1972; Li and Gleitman 2002).
4.2 Thinking for Speaking
In part, the ‘‘Does language shape thought?’’ question has been difficult
to answer because it is so imprecise. A different phrasing has been suggested
by Slobin (1996), who proposed replacing language and thought
with speaking, thinking, and thinking for speaking. One advantage of
this substitution is that it allows us to distinguish between what are often
called linguistic and nonlinguistic thought. Basically, cognitive processes
involved in accessing and selecting words, placing them in grammatical
structures, planning speech, and so on, are all instances of thinking for
speaking. Thinking for speaking differs from one language to another.
For example, when planning to utter a verb, English speakers never need
to worry about grammatical gender agreement between the verb and the
subject of the sentence. By contrast, Russian speakers do need to worry
about this, and so their thinking for speaking will necessarily be different
from that of English speakers.
4.3 Beyond Thinking for Speaking
A further question to ask is whether the habits that people acquire in
thinking for speaking a particular language will manifest themselves in
their thinking even when they are not planning speech in that language.
What if people are performing some nonlinguistic task (i.e., a task that
can be accomplished through some nonlinguistic means) or thinking for
a different language? For example, are native Russian speakers more
likely to notice whether all or only some of the peanuts were eaten even
when they’re speaking English? One way to rephrase the ‘‘Does language
shape thought?’’ question is to ask, ‘‘Does thinking for speaking a particular
language have an effect on how people think when not thinking
for speaking that same language?’’
62 Boroditsky, Schmidt, and Phillips
Further, how (through what cognitive mechanisms) can thinking for
speaking a particular language exert influence over other types of thinking?
Are some cognitive domains more susceptible to linguistic influence
than others, and if so, why? For example, early work on color showed
striking similarity in color memory among speakers of different languages
despite wide variation in color terminology (Heider 1972; but see
Davidoff, Davies, and Roberson 1999; Kay and Kempton 1984; Lucy
and Shweder 1979). However, research into how people conceptualize
more abstract domains like time has uncovered striking crosslinguistic
differences in thought (Boroditsky 1999, 2001). Why would there be
such strong evidence for universality in color perception, but quite the
opposite for thinking about time? One possibility is that language is most
powerful in influencing thought for more abstract domains, that is, ones
not so reliant on sensory experience (Boroditsky 1999, 2000, 2001).
While the ability to perceive colors is heavily constrained by universals of
physics and physiology, the conception of time (say, as a vertical or a
horizontal medium) is not constrained by physical experience and so is
free to vary across languages and cultures (see Boroditsky 2000, 2001,
for further discussion).
In this chapter, I consider an extreme point along this concreteabstract
continuum: the influence of grammatical gender on the way
people think about inanimate objects. Forks and frying pans do not (by
virtue of being inanimate) have a biological gender. The perceptual information
available for most objects does not provide much evidence
as to their gender, and so conclusive information about the gender of
objects is only available in language (and only in those languages that
have grammatical gender). This chapter examines whether people’s mental
representations of objects are influenced by the grammatical genders
assigned to these objects’ names in their native language."
Go with God Reza,
Reza
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